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Introduction

This Newsletter will focus on the role of the internet and communication technologies in various forms of sexual abuse and exploitation. The Internet, as one of the most commonly used forms of modern communication, has led to global changes in methods and speed of communication, and has impacted all areas of our lives. It is difficult to imagine what today's communication, businesses or society in general would be like without modern technology. World statistics show that approximately 2.7 billion people have access to the internet, and it is predicted that this number will reach 3 billion by the end of this year. The emergence of such technologies, and their increasingly global use, has enabled traffickers and predators to operate in a way that was never possible before, globally escalating sexual exploitation. Although not harmful in themselves, technologies such as messaging services, social networking sites and online classified sites have served to provide new, efficient and anonymous means of exploiting victims.

Internet and communication technologies have made Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) incredibly easy to produce, view and distribute. *This Newsletter shall use the term 'CSAM' throughout, since the term 'child pornography' is misleading and diminishes the severity of this crime.* CSAM being increasingly available, accessible, and affordable has expanded the market for such material. Technological advancements have also increased image and video storage capacity; many offenders' collections are a terabyte in size. The internet has fostered a subculture for CSAM consumers to share material, and discuss sources of material, grooming methods, and methods to avoid law enforcement, thereby normalizing such behaviour for offenders. The number of children involved, the number of images, the number of consumers and the graphic nature of the content have increased exponentially since the internet, which constitutes the primary source for CSAM acquisition and distribution.

Children are being groomed online for sexual abuse. Groomers may attempt to meet the child for physical abuse, but children are increasingly being groomed for abuse that does not occur in person but online, through sexual conversations, images and/or acts performed via webcam. Children are increasingly connected to the internet, and the use of social networking sites has exploded in recent years amongst teenagers and younger children, despite age restrictions. These sites, as well as chat rooms and gaming consoles, enable offenders to contact children who they would not have had access to in the past. Without spatial and time constraints, offenders can groom many victims at once, away from adult supervision, particularly as parents tend to be less involved in their child's online life and less vigilant with their online contacts. Through the internet, groomers can find personal information regarding their targets, which they can use to their advantage.

In the past decade, Internet usage rates around the world have increased dramatically, bringing the world toward universal Internet access. In 2010, the number of world internet users reached 2 billion individuals; a 200% increase in just 5 years. This rapid growth rate can be seen mainly in developing nations; in the Philippines, over 36% of the population had internet access in 2012, compared to less than 2% in 2000. Although positive for a country's development, impoverished families are faced with huge financial incentives to sexually exploit their children. As a result, the internet has

allowed child-sex tourism to expand online, with sexual abuse of children being live-streamed via webcam; Webcam Child-sex tourism (WCST). As global internet rates continue to rise in developing countries, this phenomenon is growing in scope and becoming increasingly relevant.

Furthermore, internet and communication technologies have increased the demand for sexual services, and thus for sex trafficking. Technology and the internet have become the greatest facilitators of the commercial sex trade, and a major impetus for its growth. Sex trafficking has become more lucrative, as traffickers can reach a broader bases of clients, who are willing to pay more for the anonymity provided by the internet. Furthermore, traffickers are distanced from monetary transactions and do not risk their victims being seen on the street by law enforcement, making their activity lower risk; this is also a reason why the internet has facilitated the demand for sex trafficking of children. Technology has also dramatically altered the way in which traffickers recruit victims, advertise the sexual services of their victims, and communicate with clients; an entire trafficking ring can now be run from a smart phone.

However, although new technology has provided new channels for abuse to exploitative individuals, it has also provided new opportunities for law enforcement to detect perpetrators and gather evidence.

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Online Grooming

Online grooming involves the process of a groomer trying to set up a sexually abusive situation, but through the use of cyber-technology, such as the internet or mobile phones.

It is recommended that you read Newsletter #4 for a full explanation of offline grooming, as this Newsletter seeks to build upon that information and provide insight into how online grooming is different.

How the internet can affect behaviour

Although in theory the internet is just another public space, evidence suggests that individuals' behaviour may change online. This is important in the context of online grooming, not only considering the behaviour of a groomer, but also of potential victims.

Anonymity allows people to detach their online behaviour from their offline identity. Many internet users present themselves differently online, and compartmentalising this online 'self' can distance them from their online actions, fuels denial and can even be used to justify actions. This is not only the case for offenders who seek out their sexual desires online, but also children engaging in risky behaviour online. Invisibility encourages people to act in ways that they would usually refrain from, and delays emotional responses such as embarrassment. Groomers abuse this, and children may engage in ways that are uncharacteristic.

There is also evidence that a person's behaviour changes when they change their self-representation online. This is concerning, since young people often assume different identities online. Children who present themselves as sexually promiscuous may be encouraged to act in a certain way, making them more vulnerable to exploitation.

Furthermore, children can find it difficult to separate the facts from online fantasy when chatting online.

Children's access to the internet in Europe

The following statistics are taken from a 2011 European-wide study by the EUKidsOnline network.

Although these are the most recent and thorough available, numbers are likely to have risen since this report, as internet usage rates continue to rise and devices such as smartphones and tablets are becoming increasingly affordable.

- Internet use is thoroughly embedded in children's daily lives: 80% of 15-16 year olds and a third of 9-10 year olds go online daily; 93% of 9-16 year old users go online at least weekly; 60% go online every day or almost every day;

- The average age of first internet use is 8 in several Northern European countries.

- Most children access the internet at home (87%), or school (63%).

- 33% of 9-16 year olds access the internet via a mobile phone or handheld device;

- 76% use instant messaging services; 39% post images; 31% use a webcam; 16% use file-sharing sites; and 11% blog;

- 59% of 9-16 year olds have a social networking profile: 26% of children aged 9-10, 49% aged 11-12, 73% aged 13-14 and 82% aged 15-16;

- Of children with a social networking profile, 26% have entirely public profiles (rates are higher in Eastern Europe: 55% in Hungary, 46% in Turkey and 44% in Romania); 43% have private profiles that can only be viewed by online contacts; 28% have partially private profiles visible to the contacts and networks of their own contacts;

- 29% have more than 100 contacts;

- 22% of children with public profiles display their address and/or phone number (compared to 11% of children with private profiles).

- Generally, 9-12 year olds are more likely than 13-16 year olds to have public profiles;

- 1 in 8 children have seen or received sexual images or messages online

- Of those who were upset to receive such images, only about 40% block the sender

- 30% of European children aged 9-16 who use the internet have communicated in the past with someone they have not met face-to-face before

- 9% of children have met an online contact offline in the past year.

- Children whose parents do not allow them to have a social networking profile are 21% more likely to have a public profile.

Initial contact

Whether or not an offender has access to a child is a determining factor in whether they will attempt to groom a child. Whereas offenders used to be restricted to children in their communities, the internet provides offenders access to children that they would never have had access to in the past, from all over the world. The large numbers of minors and children who use internet and communication technologies means that it is easy for groomers to find child victims online, allowing them to be very specific in selecting victims. They can target multiple victims at the same time, over a wide area. Some groomers may work together to help each other find and groom victims.

Groomers search for victims on websites that are visited by large numbers of young people. Many groomers search chat rooms, especially those which are specifically focussed around

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young people's interests. Within such chat rooms, groomers might manipulate potential victims to initiate contact, in order for them to look more trustworthy (asking questions such as, 'do any girls know where to buy cheap pink lip gloss?'). Social networking sites, dating sites or gaming site are also frequently used. Groomers can also hunt for potential victims through personal websites, such as blogs (online diaries), sporting club websites or school websites.

Some groomers pretend to be younger or of a different gender, using photographs of other people. However, most groomers do not do this. Instead, most exploit the emotional vulnerability of the victim by posing as an understanding older person, or a trusted peer. This is helped by the fact that many young people find the experience of meeting new people to be easier online than in person, and may proactively be seeking new friendships online. Vulnerable children may be online to seek validation or support, which can easily be exploited. Many children mistakenly believe that they are anonymous online, and therefore take greater risks; children who would never speak to an unknown older individual or stranger in person may be more tempted to engage in conversation through various technologies.

Even children who are aware of the risks involved may talk to strangers online. The most common causes seem to be

boredom, curiosity and inhibition. Many young people do not regard their online contacts as 'strangers', even if they have never met in person. Therefore they do not see communication as risky behaviour. Early stages of online grooming do not differ widely from how legitimate online relationships form, making it very difficult for children to recognise an exploitative individual.

Like offline grooming, the groomer and victim may know each other. Victims may even be groomed by their own family members. There have been cases where perpetrators have pretended to be someone that the target already knew on social networking sites and instant messaging applications. It is even possible for young people to exploit other young people of a younger age, the same age or even older than themselves. Social networks also allow perpetrators access to their victim's friends or younger siblings, often using a different online identity.

In order to assist in building relationships and establishing a 'bond', groomers ensure that they are well-acquainted with common topics of conversation of children and young people, and will keep up-to-date with popular culture. Groomers may even synchronise their communication style with that of their target, to put them at ease.

There are groomers who find the process of grooming itself

enjoyable and rewarding; such 'hit-and-run' groomers may gain stimulation from the process regardless of whether it leads to abuse.

The role of the internet in allowing groomers to find out information about their target/victim

Internet and communication technologies allow the groomer to find out information about their targets without the child's knowledge, even before initiating contact. This can be achieved through social media accounts, especially if the target has limited privacy settings, but also through searching online data bases or just through search engines. Even if a child has high privacy settings, perpetrators can find clues through their online friends whose settings may be less private. As well as finding out the child's name and what they look like, perpetrators can find out personal details such as the child's age, address, school, email address and mobile number.

By finding information regarding music artists, sports teams, or activities or hobbies the child is interested in, groomers can pretend to have common interests and thus gain their trust. Such information also informs groomers of the type of gift to offer the child, both to gain

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affection and to seek sexual 'repayment'.

Groomers will attempt to establish whether a child is suitable for grooming. Like offline grooming, perpetrators may preferentially target vulnerable children, as they tend to be more receptive to advances. Groomers will establish whether a child feels lonely or seems to be neglected or alienated. They try to find out as much as possible about the victim's family and their friendship groups in order to judge the likelihood of the child telling their friends or families. Through information available online and piecing together clues from what the child tells them online, groomers can learn how frequently their parents are at work, how often the child is left at home alone, and when this occurs. They may ask questions such as, 'where is your computer in your house?' to determine the proximity of family members. If a groomer deems a child 'safe enough' to groom, they will attempt to isolate, flatter, and potentially eventually threaten and intimidate the child into their control. Even if children think that they are being careful, communicating online with unknown individuals puts them at a great risk.

Like offline grooming, there is a pattern of escalating forms of control. Manipulators aim to groom the child to make them feel comfortable enough to either meet in person, or be exploited online through indecent images or videos or webcams.

Escalating control

Groomers often use various types of cyber - technologies in the process of grooming, increasingly positioning themselves for abuse. For example, after meeting a victim in a public chatroom or through social networks (or in person), they may instigate moving the conversation into a private chat room, instant messenger service, or emails, where they can start exchanging pictures or videos. They may even provide the child with a pre-paid mobile phone. By using several communication techniques, the offender immerses himself into the victim's life; making the victim more accessible but also increasing the victim's reliance upon the groomer.

Although the length of the process varies with each child, grooming can be much faster online than offline. Online technologies grant groomers with many more opportunities to interact with their victims. With smart phones, victims can be groomed 24/7, in any location; the usual limitations of time and access do not have to be adhered to. The anonymity that the internet allows can result in conversation escalating more quickly and children often come to trust an online acquaintance more quickly than they would in person. The groomer and victim can interact from a distance, even from different countries; they are away from adult supervision and so suspicion is easier to avoid.

Grooming cannot be generalised;

it is a highly individualised process. For example, particularly compassionate children may be groomed through the perpetrator posing as someone in distress or needing help. Groomers are self-taught experts in getting children to reveal their needs and desires, and exploiting them by tailoring their messages to these needs. However, if a potential victim rejects a groomer's advances online, it is easy for the groomer to disappear and reappear as 'someone else', wiser to the victim's preferences and limits.

Like offline grooming, perpetrators will often tell their victims to keep the communication private. However, online groomers have the advantage of being able to claim that reporting their conversations to their families may result in their technological devices being confiscated; children and young people who feel dependent upon such devices, or who already feel lonely or isolated, are unlikely to want to have them confiscated. Furthermore, children who have been warned of the dangers of online chat with strangers may fear getting into trouble for failing to comply with their parents' instructions.

Grooming online allows groomers to test the child's boundaries more easily. Groomers often introduce sexual themes to the conversation, such as asking about the victim's sexual experiences; children may feel less threatened by sexually explicit conversations initiated by the groomer when these occur through technology and not face-to-face. Groomers often expose the child to inappropriate and illegal sexual material - a crime in its own right in most European countries - to lower the child's inhibitions. CSAM is particularly used for this purpose, as the

Always cover your webcam unless you are communicating with friends! It is easy for your computer to become infected with viruses that allow the sender to watch you and take photographs/videos through your webcam.



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groomer attempts to normalise children being involved in sexual activity. Groomers may claim that they are depicted in the pornographic material that they send (though since such material could be used as evidence of illegal activity, such material is unlikely to depict them in reality); children may then be encouraged to send similar images of themselves in 'repayment', viewing such activity as reciprocal and not exploitative.

As with offline grooming, the relationship will often escalate to sexual abuse, with children believing the activity to be consensual. **There does not need to be physical contact or an actual meeting between the groomer and victim for online exploitation to take place.** The abuse may take the form of sexual conversations; the child sending indecent images of themselves; such images being shared by the perpetrator; or the child performing sexual acts via webcam for the perpetrator and/or others. **The cycle of online abuse has the same devastating impact as when it occurs in person.**

Although perpetrators may attempt to meet the child in person in order to abuse them, *children are increasingly being groomed online for the sole purpose of online sexual abuse.* Although grooming for the purpose of meeting offline is still a risk, many online groomers never attempt to meet their victims. In fact, CEOP (Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre), a British organisation, reported that only 7% of the 1,145 online grooming cases reported in the UK in 2012 involved offenders attempting to meet a child in person. Two brothers in Kuwait who were recently charged with the online sexual exploitation of 110 children worldwide made no attempts to meet any of their victims in person.

Some children are abused without their knowledge. After communicating with their victim online, some groomers have used

Anna, 12

I met someone on a social networking site who said they were 13 but when I met up with him he was much older... he touched me in a way I didn't like.. I have not told anyone what happened. He told me to keep it a secret and I am scared of what might happen if I tell anyone because he said that if I told, worse things would happen.

viruses or Trojan programs to gain control of their victim's computer; not only allowing them access to private information that can assist in the grooming process, but enabling them to turn on the victim's webcam so that they can watch the victim and take photographs without the victim's knowledge.

Online groomers will often threaten and blackmail the victim using the sexual images that the child has sent them. By threatening to post these online or share them with the child's family and friends, perpetrators make higher and higher demands in a spiral of continuous abuse. This may take the form of more and more graphic online interaction, or meeting in person for sexual abuse. Some groomers hack into the social network accounts of the victim, and claim that they will not give them back the account unless they do what they are told.

Children find it very difficult to stop contact before it escalates.

Protecting children from online grooming

The IFS - EMMAUS website, <http://sigurnodijete.ba/> provides information and advice regarding safe use of the internet, for young children, teenagers and parents. The following guidelines for parents, guardians and teachers have been taken from the site. These guidelines should not be limited to desk top computers; the same guidelines apply for all internet devices used by children, such as smart phones, games consoles and tablets. The list below is inclusive; some of the guidelines are not appropriate for some age groups and should be adapted. Children's recollection of internet safety messages weakens over time; educational messages need to be frequent and consistent.

www.itunews.itu.int



Elizabeth, 15

"I met Billy on a social network site. He said he was 17. We chatted most nights and he said he was in love with me. He wanted me to send pictures of myself to him, and said if I did he would send me a picture of him and we could meet up. We just shared photos to start with. Billy was really nice to me and he started to feel like my boyfriend. I told my friends about him and we spoke about a few of us meeting up. When he started talking about sexual things I wasn't too worried at first; my friends said it was just what boys did. So I went along with it, I sent photos of myself naked. Billy told me that he was 44, but that he did love me and that age didn't change anything. I tried to stop the contact, but he threatened to share the pictures of me on the internet and to all my friends. I was going through a hard time at home; I had no one apart from him. It didn't seem wrong when he said we should be together. He continued to try to contact and threaten me. I had very mixed emotions and started to self-harm. I got in touch with a helpline and realised that I was being groomed. I wanted him out of my life. But now that he's gone I miss him and feel lonely. I just want to forget about him and everything he did, but I don't think it's that simple because I can't. I feel like he's taken away everything and that my life cannot be the same because he's hurt me so much."

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- Teach your child to never disclose any personal information online (including name, address, phone number, passwords, parents' names, the name of their schools or clubs that they attend, etc.)
- Teach your child not to disclose when they will be alone or without parental supervision
- Teach your child that they should never send photographs of themselves to anyone, without parental consent
- Disable the use of Chat rooms (which are a common place for sexual predators to network)
- Block instant and personal messages from people your child does not know. (Teach children that if they receive messages from unknown persons, they must not reply or open any files or images received. Regularly check your child's internet address book to ensure that there are no unknown persons)
- Place your computer somewhere in the home where you can easily monitor their activity on the computer.
- Regularly ask your child about his activities on the Internet and his/her internet friends.
- Install software to protect your privacy and to protect from inappropriate content
- Set the internet rules with your child, both inside and outside of the home
- Spend some time with your child while they are connected to the internet (try to build an atmosphere of trust regarding his use of computers and his internet activities)
- Keep track of time that your child is spending on the Internet and in which time of day. (too much time on the internet may imply a problem. The time of day is irrelevant; offenders can be operating from different time zones)
- Do not allow your child to create an internet profile with personal information. (this will greatly reduce the danger of contact by strangers. Services where a profile can be created include facebook.com, Myspace.com, AOL profiles, etc.)
- Emphasize to your child that the Internet is a privilege not a right.
- Teach your child that they can never personally meet with the people they have met online, unless you are with them
- Emphasise to children that it is not their fault if they receive disturbing or sexual messages. If they receive content that makes them feel uncomfortable, they must leave the communication and tell a parent.

Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM)

Definitions:

At a minimum, CSAM is a picture of a child that is engaged, or depicted to be engaged, in explicit sexual activity. However, legal definitions of what constitutes CSAM vary between countries. An overview of national legislation regarding child abuse images in European countries can be found on page 7

Simulated CSAM can include altered images of real children; adults (individuals 18 and older) who have been made to appear like children; and images that have been computer-generated. Countries differ in whether their legislation criminalises such material.

Who are the victims?

The following statistics are from INHOPE (2013):

- In 2013, 71% of victims were pre-pubescent, 19% were pubescent and 10% were infants. Particularly worrying is that the proportion of infants is increasing;
- INHOPE received and confirmed 54,969 reports of CSAM in 2013; an increase of 47% from 2012 (37,404 reports);
- 81% of CSAM in 2013 depicted female victims (an increase from 70% in 2011 and 75% in 2012); 11% depicted males (a decrease from 20% in 2011); 8% depicted both male and female children;

Which countries are hosting CSAM?

- 52% of the world's CSAM sites are hosted in Europe (44% in North America; 3% in Asia)

Non-commercial hosting:

- 87% of sites hosting CSAM in 2013 were non-commercial, an increase from 82% in 2012.
- In Europe, non-commercial sites were mainly found in the following INHOPE member countries: the Netherlands (48%); Russia (33%); Germany (6%) Luxembourg (5%).
- Of European countries that are not INHOPE members, Ukraine hosts 50% of CSAM sites and Sweden 12%.

Commercial hosting:

- 19% of the world's commercial CSAM sites are hosted by the Netherlands; 8% by Russia; and 2% by each Luxembourg, Germany and Czech Republic.

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How is CSAM viewed, shared and distributed?

	Website	File host	Image host	Social networking	Banner site
2011	20%	11%	53%	2%	13%
2012	42%	4%	41%	3%	11%
2013	37%	29%	22%	7%	5%

Site type of CSAM hosting - INHOPE 2013

Every possible means is used by offenders to distribute and share CSAM, and discuss sources of CSAM and methods to avoid law enforcement detection. However, an offender's method generally depends on their online experience and technological ability.

The majority use multiple techniques, commonly peer-to-peer (P2P) networks; Internet Relay Chat (IRC); websites (including legitimate websites); Email, Chat Rooms, Instant Messaging, webcam, newsgroups, bulletin boards. Offenders may change methods depending on what is seen to be targeted by law enforcement, and as new technologies emerge.

CSAM can be extremely difficult to detect without prior knowledge; most is located on the deep web, invisible to search engines, and codewords and passwords are common. Advanced offenders use various techniques to remain anonymous.

Accessibility, Availability and Affordability

The internet has made CSAM a global crime that transcends borders. Spatial and time constraints have been removed, enabling offenders to download, trade, and produce CSAM at any time and with anyone in the world.

CSAM has been made extremely accessible by the internet. Offenders do not need to visit sex shops, wait for material to arrive in the mail, or find individuals with the same interests for meet-ups (granting anonymity), as they would have had to in the past; they can download large amounts of images and videos at any time without leaving their homes. Such

an environment has led to a larger number of consumers of CSAM, including casual users who would not have sought out CSAM without the internet. In addition, offenders are obtaining increasingly vast numbers of files, as the nature of networking and technological advancements allow for fast downloads, and large home data storage capacity. Law enforcement has reported finding collections nearing a terabyte in size.

Viewing and trading CSAM does not require high levels of technological knowledge. Although many offenders attempt to avoid law enforcement detection through various strategies, CSAM itself is very accessible. This can affect offenders' sense of wrongdoing; they can tell themselves that harmful activity would involve overcoming more barriers.

The availability of images is in part fuelled by the ease of producing them. Digital camera technology has made CSAM cheap and easy to produce and upload. Third parties are no longer required for developing images, and so anonymity is maintained. As CSAM becomes increasingly easy to produce, it is likely that its production will increase.

The ease of producing CSAM is not limited to adult abusers, and in many countries 'sexting' has become widespread amongst minors. Although minors may film or video themselves voluntarily for private use, they can end up on CSAM sites. In 2012, over 12,200 self-generated images and videos of individuals aged 13 to 20 were found on pornographic websites. Almost 90% of these had been taken from the original location.

This ease of access to CSAM resulting from the internet has led to prices of CSAM dropping. In fact, free CSAM is so widespread through various channels that many users are suspicious of websites or individuals who charge for material. Some consumers will pay for expenses related to CSAM; they will pay for methods that allow access to other consumers or that enhance their privacy. For example, they may pay to create or upgrade a P2P account, or for an anonymiser service. Some websites require users to pay to for a password to access a site. However, these fees are not prohibitive, ranging from \$10 a month, and they can be circumvented by networking with administrators, who supply free usernames and passwords. This affordability may be another driving force for abusive behaviour.

Whether or not an offender pays for CSAM seems to affect how they perceive their crime; offenders who have not paid for CSAM commonly believe that they have not supported an illegal activity. Similarly, offenders who do not produce their own material tend to see possession of CSAM as a victimless crime and not as child abuse, viewing those who produce such material as the transgressors. Offenders often attempt to justify their actions.

Similarly, the prevalence of CSAM serves to reinforce and normalise collecting behaviour. Availability can affect offenders' perceptions of the safety and legality in procuring CSAM; the vast number of images, and the anonymity that the internet provides, can lead offenders to feel invisible and thus secure in their activity remaining undetected. Many see their

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participation as being less harmful than more advanced users, or producers. Collecting is often referred to on CSAM bulletin boards as a “hobby”, serving to normalise the practise.

Who are the offenders?

Although some researches have suggested that very few users of CSAM use any form of protection behaviour, such research is based on offenders who have been arrested for CSAM offenses; users who use sophisticated technology to avoid detection are unlikely to appear in such researches. Although there seems to be a trend of offenders being white, male and educated, having preconceived ideas of child sex offenders can be unhelpful; there is no one type of internet CSAM consumer. Offenders may come from all walks of life and show few warning signs. It is therefore more useful to categorize offenders based on their motives, engagement in networking, security measures, and the extent to which their behaviour involves the direct sexual abuse of children. The offending typologies are as follows:

Browsers: Offenders who knowingly save CSAM images after stumbling upon them passively. They do not network with other offenders and do not employ security strategies to avoid detection.

Private fantasizers: Offenders who create digital images for their own private use. They do not network with other offenders or employ security strategies.

Trawlers: Offenders who seek CSAM on the internet through open browsers. They may engage in minimal networking, but they employ few security strategies.

Non - secure collectors: Offenders who seek CSAM in non-secure chat rooms and other open levels of the Internet. They engage in relatively high levels of networking but do not employ security strategies. The non-secure nature of their activities limits the number and nature of images they can collect.

Secure collectors: Offenders who are members of a closed

CSAM group or network. They are involved in high levels of networking and utilise sophisticated security measures to prevent detection. Occupying hidden levels of the internet enables them access to a wide range and vast number of images. Some offenders will carefully catalogue and cross reference images, and seek highly prized images; the collection may even become an end in itself.

Groomers: Offenders who send CSAM to children as part of the grooming process. They may or may not network with other offenders. Their behaviour involves the direct abuse of children.

Physical abusers: Offenders who sexually abuse children and whose interest in CSAM is a part of their interests in children. They may record their abusive behaviours for personal use. They may or may not network. Their behaviour directly abuses victims and their security depends upon silence of the victim(s).

Producers: Offenders who record the sexual abuse of children for the purpose of disseminating it. The extent of their networking varies depending on whether they are also distributors. Their abuse is direct; compromising their security.

Distributors: Offenders who disseminate CSAM. Some have a purely financial interest in CSAM, though this is rare. Any offender who shares images can be classified as a distributor. The extent of their networking, level of security, and whether they engage in direct abuse of children depends upon the level at which they operate.

Motives for Wanting CSAM

Internet CSAM users are not necessarily paedophiles (persons who are primarily or exclusively sexually attracted to prepubescent children). The ability to interact anonymously while online encourages people to express thoughts and desires that they may not express in their everyday lives. Offenders vary in the strength of their interest in such images, as well as in the severity

of the images that they are attracted to.

Offenders with sexual motives for viewing CSAM can have a variety of deviant sexual interests, including a particular sexual preference for children.

However, motives for viewing CSAM may be non-sexual. Curiosity, and the perceived ‘rush’ provided through the illegality of CSAM, are commonly reported motives for viewing CSAM. Some individuals collect CSAM for the challenge it poses; such individuals are likely to collect a wide variety of images and genres. For many, social networks and virtual communities play an important role. Furthermore, some offenders may distribute or produce CSAM purely to earn money, though this is unusual.

Some offenders describe their relationship with CSAM as an addiction or obsession. In fact, law enforcement in the USA regularly witness offenders expressing gratitude to the government for forcing them to stop downloading CSAM. Although clinical help is increasingly available, many offenders do not know where to access it and fear that treatment is non-confidential or could involve law enforcement. Furthermore, treatment within prison is scarce, and usually only available for inmates nearing the time of their release.

CSAM online community subculture

Although CSAM is easy to find and access, the majority of material is widely shared and recirculated. The internet enables CSAM users to network and build relationships to access new and private material; discuss sources of CSAM; share law enforcement evasion techniques; and chat with like - minded individuals. The resultant subculture has its own values, social hierarchy, and specialized language.

Online CSAM communities tend to be very structured. Networks and the hierarchies within them tend to be based on the size and quality of a perpetrator’s collection. Private material is prized particularly highly. Most trading

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groups comprise of fewer than 10 individuals for security reasons, however larger trading groups of 30 to 50 individuals certainly exist and groups can grow quickly. Within these groups, trades occur frequently. Groups are sometimes based around a specific genre of CSAM Sharing images is usually reciprocal; offenders give and take equal numbers of files. Individuals who are new to building a collection will 'beg' for images until they build a collection that they can use in trades. Offenders may also hack into the computers of other offenders to enable acquisition of private material.

Individuals interested in joining a community may be screened by a moderator. 'Elite' offenders gain entry to private, exclusive groups through having a superior collection of images and through developing relationships with other users. Producers of CSAM are likely to be found within such groups, and they will share material that they have produced, and that is not available through mainstream channels. Closed trade groups are accessible by invitation only, and members often have to prove their knowledge of specific CSAM images, as well as knowing a password. Although groups may disband if a security threat is perceived, chat rooms and messaging services assist in sustaining relationships.

Some traders may meet their trading partners in person, for social or security reasons.

Interestingly, some CSAM chat service operators have been known to ban participants from meeting in real life in case such behaviour led to child molestation.

Why CSAM communities are concerning

Channels such as chat rooms allow offenders to communicate with like - minded individuals, reinforcing and normalizing the trading and downloading of CSAM. This is compounded as users discuss their fantasies, which may involve sexually abusing children, and boast about their sexual exploits with children; whether real or imaginary. The sense of community created can provide offenders with social validation, which can be a key factor in them continuing to engage in offending behaviour.

Communities can even produce a form of social pressure for individuals to produce their own CSAM in order to maintain status and guarantee their access to more images. Some networks will only allow an offender to continue to download images if they upload increasingly graphic contributions. Thus, such networks also serve to fuel the demand for increasingly graphic images. Since image trading tends to be reciprocal, offenders may produce CSAM in order to access private material. Offenders have reported that pressure from within their networks led to them producing CSAM involving their child.

Methods used by offenders to avoid law enforcement

As described, offenders vary in their collecting behaviour and networking level. Some offenders are technologically sophisticated and will share strategies to evade law enforcement within structured trading networks, whereas other offenders use only rudimentary methods to download, store, and share CSAM.

Analysis of convicted offenders would suggest that CSAM users rarely use any encryption or passwords to protect their collections. However, such analysis would be inherently biased since the majority of arrests are of low-level or careless perpetrators. Law enforcement tends to focus on offenders with the least technological expertise due to the lack of time and resources, and the vast number of offenders. Technologically advanced offenders, who are often responsible for producing CSAM, are much more difficult to track down. Such advanced offenders are aware of this, and their sense of security may encourage them to continue with their behaviour.

Serious users will not use networks where they have to trust a third party, such as P2P networks. They use advanced strategies to evade law enforcement, which often require more technical expertise.

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Offenders may attempt to modify the way in which they download images based on their assumptions about law enforcement practises. Rudimentary methods include using channels felt to be less commonly used by offenders; downloading images instead of uploading images; limiting trading networks to individuals who they deem trustworthy, sometimes based on others' reviews; only sharing images after receiving images (due to a belief that it is illegal for law enforcement to send illegal images); downloading large batch files of largely legal adult material with small numbers of illegal child images. However, all these tactics can be and are detected by law enforcement.

The fear of law enforcement and discussion of techniques to avoid detection may further strengthen the sense of community for offenders.

Content Changes

Although most CSAM is recirculated older material, new material is constantly being made. This is largely a result of the proliferation of digital camera technology, which has made production of images easy and does not require a third party for images to be developed.

Most of this new material is becoming increasingly graphic, and with increasingly younger children. However, there is also an increasing amount of child erotica being produced, since it is easier for such material to evade law enforcement. The fact that camera phones are now ubiquitous,

enabling photography at any moment, has led to many websites consisting purely of 'candid' images. Smart phones and other technologies allow predators to take photographs of children in public without anyone knowing. Such child erotica is rarely investigated and prosecuted, especially in countries where nude images of children are not necessarily illegal.

Does CSAM encourage physical child abuse?

Regardless of whether or not CSAM encourages, or leads to, physical abuse of a child by its users, children are sexually exploited and abused to produce such material. Offenders who do not produce their own material may tell themselves that their crime is victimless, or even that it prevents them from molesting children. However, viewing CSAM not only exploits the children depicted, it also creates a demand for CSAM and thus for the sexual exploitation of children.

CSAM consumers are not necessarily involved in physical sexual abuse of children. Similarly, sexual abusers of children will not necessarily be users of CSAM. Many people access CSAM without ever physically abusing a child. The ease of access on the internet may encourage casual users or people who may never have sought out traditional forms of CSAM to satisfy their curiosity.

Although the link between online and physical child abuse cannot be determined, it cannot be denied that the subculture and communities surrounding CSAM serve to normalize abusive

behaviour, and that this may make physical abuse more likely. Similarly, such abuse may become more likely as CSAM consumers become increasingly desensitized to objectifying children. Furthermore, the desire to view new material may trigger offenders to produce their own material to trade.

Strategies to stop CSAM proliferation

Without enough resources to target all offenders, stakeholders are overwhelmed by the amount of accessible CSAM. Unable to conduct proactive investigations, they instead focus on responding to tips and referrals, often from federal agencies. The high volume of tips frequently results in primarily reactive work, which typically leads to the targeting of less sophisticated offenders

Eliminating CSAM from the Internet is an unrealistic goal. However, its proliferation could be limited in a number of ways. This will be discussed in Newsletter #6.

European legislation regarding CSAM

Criminalizing CSAM assists in protecting children at risk of being depicted in such material, as well as protecting children in general who may be at risk of being shown such material as encouragement to participate in sexual acts.

Whether or not a child is able to fully understand or assess the impact or meaning of their participation in such material, children depicted in CSAM risk their privacy and integrity being harmed, and they are violated not

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only through the creation of such material, but also through its circulation. The child is victimised every time the material is viewed or distributed, and penalties should be applied.

CSAM is increasingly prevalent and the need for its thorough criminalization is increasingly relevant in modern society. It is possible that offenders will use another country's webserver if their own country has stricter laws, thus, countries that do not currently have a high rate of CSAM offenses still need strict laws to prevent it.

Definition of CSAM

How countries define CSAM is incredibly important, as it affects what materials are criminalised. The CoE Lanzarote Convention defines CSAM as "any material that visually depicts a child engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit conduct or any depiction of a child's sexual organs for primarily sexual purposes."

Most European countries have compatible definitions in their legislation. Some countries do not provide a definition of CSAM in their legislation; Poland and Italy allow the judge to interpret the term broadly and adapt it with the case. Whereas FYROM stipulates that such material is *visual*, Greece, Norway, Sweden and Malta state that CSAM can be through any medium, including drawings, cartoons and text.

Greece's definition of CSAM may even be wider than that of the Lanzarote convention, criminalising depiction of any part of a minor's body that may lead

to sexual stimulation. In contrast, the wording of Latvia's legislation means that understanding of the term 'sexual organs' has caused difficulties in practise; legs, breasts and buttocks are excluded from the definition of sexual organs in the context of erotic performances. FYROM's legislation does not mention depiction of a child's sexual organs for sexual purposes.

Criminality in Norway does not require that the acts depicted are sexually motivated; any presentation of a child as a sexual object is criminal. Similarly, images that were not originally sexually motivated can be regarded as being of a sexual nature if they are taken from that context by unauthorised individuals for sexual purposes. Likewise, Finland criminalises any pictures that combine sexuality and a child. In contrast, for images to constitute CSAM in Germany, there has to be a sexual connotation. Thus, nude images of children do not necessarily constitute such material. Although Estonia does criminalise images depicting a child in an erotic situation, these are only criminalised if the child is under 14 years of age, and there is no legal definition for 'erotic images'. It is not always necessary for a child to be physically involved in sexual activity; the presence of a child witnessing such activity is sufficient in Ireland, Germany, Sweden and Portugal.

Many countries do not define images that have been created for purposes with artistic, medical, scientific or similar merit, and not for sexual purposes, as CSAM. However, most countries require that content is deemed ap-

propriate. However, all images that could be considered CSAM are criminalized in Latvia, regardless of their purpose.

Simulated CSAM

Simulated CSAM includes modified photographs of real children; older teenagers or adults made to look like children; and images created entirely through a computer. Such images can be indistinguishable from 'real' CSAM. Simulated CSAM also includes non-realistic cartoons and animations.

Simulated CSAM that has been entirely created by a computer is not always criminalised by European countries; even under the Lanzarote Convention, Parties have the right to not criminalize the production or possession of CSAM "consisting exclusively of simulated representations or realistic images of a non-existent child".

Countries such as Sweden, Netherlands and Germany penalize all forms of simulated CSAM, including that which has been entirely digitally-created. In contrast, Slovakia's legislation does not penalize any form of simulated CSAM. Portugal, likewise, does not criminalise the possession of simulated CSAM. However, it does criminalize the production, distribution, import, export, broadcast, exhibition or transferral of *partially virtual or realistic* CSAM. In Croatia and Finland and Latvia, simulated CSAM images are only criminalised if they are realistic. Although Norway does not define whether simulated images are classified as CSAM in its

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
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legislation, this is applied in practise.

Sweden's definition of a 'child' in CSAM includes anyone over the age of 18 whose pubertal development is not complete, thus criminalising images that appear to feature children. If a child's pubertal development is complete, the accused might only be criminally liable if it is clear from the image and the surrounding circumstances (such as the marketing or advertising text) that the depicted person is under the age of 18. Similarly, Sweden criminalises "evocation pornography", where adults are portrayed as children or are provided with characteristics to bring thoughts to children in a sexual context. Croatia, Latvia and Norway, also criminalise material depicting adults who look like children.

Viewing CSAM online

Particularly worrying is that many European countries do not attribute criminal responsibility to individuals who knowingly and intentionally access CSAM but who do not download the material. This is the case for Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Estonia, Slovakia, Sweden. Sweden and Italy's legislation defines possession as arising when the image is saved by transferring it to any type of storage device; whether the material is viewed is irrelevant to criminality.

Producing and/or distributing CSAM

Countries need to criminalise recruiting and coercing children into pornographic performances, as well as knowingly attending pornographic performances that involve participation of children. Countries tend to provide higher penalties to offenders who distribute or produce CSAM, than those who only possess it.

Many countries provide higher sentences if the activity was for commercial gain (Sweden); an organised group is involved (Germany, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden); if an offender abuses multiple children (Russia, Slovakia); if violence or weapons are used (Slovakia, Sweden,

Greece); if coercion is used (Poland, Slovakia, Italy); if the offender has been operating in the field for a long time (Slovakia); if content is particularly brutal (Slovakia); if the child is below a certain age (14 years of age in FYROM, Germany and Russia; 12 in Slovenia); if the perpetrator is in a position of responsibility over the child, such as a teacher, doctor or family member (Russia, Slovakia); if the perpetrator takes advantage of a child's helplessness or dependency upon them (Poland, Slovakia, Greece); the offense occurs in public (Slovakia); or if the internet or information or telecommunication networks are used (Russia).

Latvia does not have a law specifically against producing CSAM: depending on the nature of contact and whether money is received, the offence is either 'sexual connection with a person under sixteen years of age', or 'involving a person in child prostitution'.

BiH, Croatia and Ukraine's legislation state that all profits and equipment used in production of CSAM will be confiscated from perpetrators. Russia and Ukraine deprive offenders of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities. This can be up to 20 years in Russia.

In Croatia and Norway, criminal liability is attributed to everyone who has any connection with CSAM. Italy punishes any individual who distributes or divulges specific information regarding sources of CSAM, through any means. Sweden extends punishment to anyone who arranges contact between buyers and sellers in attempts to promote trade of CSAM. Slovenia punishes anyone who discloses the identity of a minor depicted in CSAM. Attempted crimes are punished as strictly as those carried out in Poland. Malta and Germany's legislation stipulate that CSAM-related offenses must be carried out 'knowingly'.

Greece does not criminalize the attendance of pornographic performances involving the participation of children at all. Croatia,

Finland, Italy, Germany, Italy, Malta, Netherlands and Norway stipulate that attendance must be done 'knowingly' for a crime to be committed.

Age of legal responsibility

Most European countries place age of responsibility for CSAM-related offenses at 18, or in line with that for other crimes. Thus, the age of legal responsibility for CSAM-related offenses varies between countries. Poland sets the age of criminal responsibility at 17 for possession of CSAM, and at 15 for more severe offenses. Countries such as Italy charge minors who induce other minors to participate in pornographic exhibitions.

In the case of 'sexting', countries such as Finland and Germany do not prohibit images of children over the age of 16 and 14 respectively being possessed if there is consent and those images are purely for private use. However, countries such as Latvia have no such provisions, meaning that children who share images of themselves may be faced with 2 years' imprisonment for distributing CSAM.

Showing/providing pornography to a child

The majority of European countries attribute criminal illegality to showing pornographic material to a child, including Croatia, Slovakia, Finland and Latvia. BiH criminalises showing CSAM to a child.

In countries including the UK, sexual conversation with a child is considered a crime. In countries such as Greece, it is illegal to use information and communications technology to entice a child to meet in person in order to commit an offense.



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Webcam Child Sex Tourism (WCST)

The internet has enabled child sex tourism to spread online. WCST is when video footage of children performing sexual acts in front of a webcam is live-streamed to offenders.

Viewers tend to be interested in children aged between 7 and 17. However, victims can be of any age and extreme incidents have involved infants and even young babies. Both boys and girls are victims; predators around the world will pay for performances by either gender.

WCST is becoming increasingly popular. This may be because:

- It allows predators to interact with children and direct their sexual performances; similar to traditional commercial sexual exploitation of children or child-sex tourism, but without the physical risks and expenses. Perpetrators can engage much more easily and frequently;
- Increased internet access has led to a greater 'supply' of victims;
- Live-streamed performances do not leave permanent incriminating records on the perpetrator's hard-drives. WCST leaves few, if any, traces of evidence (unlike viewing or downloading pictures or files, which can be uncovered by investigators).

The performance is directed by the viewer. Common requests include the child victims posing naked; dancing naked; removing clothing; showing intimate body parts; masturbating; and/or using sex toys. Shows may involve more than a single child, and children may be asked to 'perform' on other children or adults, often family members, in a variety of ways. Research suggests that children are made to cater to whatever interest or fetish the customer has; even acts of bestiality and scatophilia have been reported by victims.

Despite similarities in the result, WCST should not be considered grooming. There is no psychological manipulation or

emotional connection to exploit; WCST is based purely on a financial transaction or the adult holding some form of power over the victim.

WCST can occur in any country in the world, but it is particularly likely to occur in countries where child protection policies are weak and where impoverished families and vulnerable children have internet access. WCST occurs over great distances; victims are likely to live in developing nations and be exploited by predators from wealthy nations. Global demand for WCST is vast, and impoverished families face financial incentives to exploit their children using webcams. The phenomenon is spreading rapidly due to rising internet rates and a growing international demand for online child sexual exploitation. Although law enforcement agencies in developing nations are working hard to find individuals responsible for forcing children to engage in WCST, governments of developed nations need to fight the demand side of the problem by dedicating resources to identify predators.

Rates of child sexual abuse are frighteningly high in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. This may be, in part, a result of the large numbers of women who take jobs overseas as domestic helpers. The children left behind are extremely vulnerable to individuals who may want to sexually exploit them, often from within their own family.

Children in rural areas in particular are increasingly being exploited through WCST, especially with globally rising internet access in rural areas. It is likely that the industry will become larger and more difficult to trace as criminals recognise the potential revenue streams and the industry becomes dominated by organised criminal syndicates. Indeed, there has been a rapid increase in the number of large-scale WCST operations in recent years, often run by foreigners.

WCST can also occur through internet-connected mobile

phones. It is likely that this trend will increase as new messaging and social networking applications make such activity increasingly easy.

How does WCST work?

Initial contact is usually made in a chatroom or through an operator. Once money has been transferred, the 'show' will begin. Research has suggested that predators pay between 7 and 70 EUR per show, depending on the length of the show, the nature of the performance, how many children are involved, and sometimes the age of the child. Sometimes the child may be permitted to keep a small proportion of their 'earnings' (usually around 3 EUR). However, even if a child receives remuneration, they are the victim of exploitation; children are unable to consent to being exploited.

The customer tells the child what to do through voice chat or written text; the child will often use GoogleTranslate if they do not speak the language.

WCST tends to occur through 1 of 3 models:

• Family-run operations

Most victims are exploited by their families or neighbours. This usually occurs in incredibly poor areas where means of income are scarce, and dire poverty and horrific circumstances mean that many families cannot see an alternative form of income and do not understand that WCST is severely traumatising, despite the lack of physical contact. They may tell themselves that it is less harmful than traditional commercial sexual exploitation. At-risk communities need to be educated on the psychological effects of such abuse, and that WCST is not an answer to financial problems. Vocational training may assist in providing long-term financial alternatives.

• Individual operations

Some children perform webcam sex shows without direct third party involvement. Their activity

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cannot be seen as consensual (children cannot consent to their own exploitation); they are victims and their need to solve their own or their family's poverty is being exploited.

• Webcam child sex tourism "dens"

Some children are hired, kidnapped or trafficked into dens, often by criminal organisations. They are kept with other children and forced to perform webcam sex shows.

Are children better off in WCST than traditional commercial sexual exploitation?

Although families may convince themselves that WCST is less harmful, this thinking is flawed

• Whilst it may be true that WCST is physically safer than traditional commercial exploitation, *WCST is occurring in addition to this, not instead of it.* WCST leads to the sexual exploitation of children who would not otherwise be sexually exploited, usually in rural areas.

• The absence of physical contact between predators and victims does not reduce the severity of the psychological trauma that WCST has on child victims. Children performing in WCST suffer the same psychological damage as any child victim of sexual exploitation. Children involved in WCST are also less likely to go to school, and show a significant educational delay when compared to children from the same socioeconomic circumstances.

• Children exploited by criminal gangs and held in 'dens' may suffer physical abuse and neglect. However, children being forced to perform by their parents may experience more distress, especially in countries that are particularly family-orientated. They feel deeply confused by their parents' actions, and are likely to blame themselves. WCST children fear their images being permanently accessible on the internet, and fear arrest for their activity. Children are outcast by society, and believe themselves to be immoral.

Maria, 13

Maria lived with her parents, who were ill and could not make enough money to support the family. Sometimes they could not afford to buy food.

Maria's mother started chatting with foreigners on dating sites, hoping to earn some extra money. But they wanted to see Maria, who was only 11 at the time. She was put in front of the camera and told to do what they asked. She started crying, but her mother told her, *"It's not so bad, they can't touch you. They are on the other side of the world, so it's all right."* After that, she was asked to perform webcam sex shows more often. She got used to it and did whatever the customers asked her to do. It became normal for her, but it was kept as a family secret. After some time, Maria's 14-year-old cousin and her boyfriend also joined her in shows. Whenever Maria wanted to stop, her mother reminded her of their debts and that they could not otherwise afford food.

Maria and her cousin now bring in enough money to support the family. But sometimes Maria performs three shows in a night. She tries to go to school during the day, but she is skipping classes because she is too tired after staying up late performing webcam sex shows.

• It is likely that the children will be made to perform with other children or adults, usually their family members. Such abuse is likely to have a severe negative impact.

Furthermore, WCST often leads to traditional child-sex tourism. It is not uncommon for the perpetrator to become the child's 'boyfriend', as the child hopes to be rescued from poverty through marriage. Chat and webcam sex sessions become frequent and the boyfriend may visit the child. By taking the child and their friends or parents out for dinner or shopping, or finding excuses to give them money, parents will be supportive of the foreign 'boyfriend' and will ignore his sexual interest in their child. The child will accompany the perpetrator to his hotel or apartment for physical abuse. It is not uncommon for perpetrators to record images or video of this abuse; sharing the resultant CSAM through networks may encourage consumers of CSAM to

engage in WCST or traditional child-sex tourism, in a cycle of abuse.

Illegality

Although WCST is a new phenomenon, it is already illegal in most countries. This is because it is a combination of traditional child commercial sexual exploitation and CSAM, which are already prohibited by international laws and most national laws, and because most countries' legislation is broad enough to implicitly cover emerging forms of sexual exploitation. In some countries, sexual conversation between an adult and a child is defined as an offense. However, some countries may require amendments to existing laws for stronger legal grounds on which to prosecute and convict perpetrators of WCST. The severity of punishment for WCS depends on the country, but punishments can be very severe.



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The use of internet in CST (Child-sex tourism)

The phenomenon of child-sex tourism was described in Newsletter #4. Child-sex tourism occurs when a person travels from one location to another, where they engage in sexual activity with a minor. Its growth in scope and size has been greatly facilitated by the internet.

As well as facilitating child sex abusers in making their travel plans, the internet has expanded the client base of CST. The Internet has enabled offenders to identify individuals willing to facilitate the crime, as it provides a convenient marketing channel for exploitative individuals. There are websites specifically for potential child sex tourists, providing pornographic accounts written by other child sex tourists; information on how to specifically procure child prostitutes; information on which establishments have child prostitutes; and prices in various destinations. Sex-tourism travel agents may publish internet brochures and guides catering to child sex tourists. Similarly, the CSAM communities already described may assist in providing information and creating an environment in which such behaviour is normalised or even aspired to. Accessibility of such information generates interest in CST and serves to create further demand.

Furthermore, offenders often produce CSAM whilst engaging in CST. Offenders who are part of a CSAM community are likely to trade this material (or stories of their activity) within their networks, potentially encouraging other CSAM users to engage in CST.

www.1.bp.blogspot.com

CHILD-SEX TOURISTS

DON'T TURN AWAY. TURN THEM IN.

The role of the internet and communication technology in sex trafficking

The advent of the Internet has presented the biggest change in the dynamics of the commercial sex economy over the past decade. The internet has not displaced street-based sex work, but has increased the demand for commercial sexual services and expanded the underground commercial sex market. Spatial limitations that constrained connections in the past have been removed; customers who would not pick up a girl on the street are able to connect to traffickers (whether they know them to be traffickers or not) and their victims through the anonymity of the internet and meet at an arranged address. The expansion of the clients of sexual services has increased demand for providers of sexual services and thus for sex trafficking.

The internet has made sex trafficking more lucrative; not only through the larger client base, but also through the higher prices that clients are willing to pay for the anonymity provided. The internet has also served to make sex trafficking less risky for perpetrators, as they are distanced from any transactions and victims are less visible to law enforcement than they would be traditionally. In many countries, law enforcement crackdowns are preventing street-based sex work, serving to push such practices online.

The internet has also made sex trafficking of children more appealing for traffickers. Not only has the internet made it incredibly easy to access children to groom for commercial sexual exploitation, it has also enabled them to be marketed and advertised out of the public eye;

internet-facilitated venues are preferable to such children being visible on the streets.

Furthermore, widespread internet use has led to substantial changes in how traffickers manage their business operations. Traffickers are increasingly engaging with customers online and can now run an entire trafficking ring from a smart phone.

Recruiting victims

Traffickers increasingly recruit individuals through social media, such as online chat rooms and dating websites, where they will make a false profile and befriend potential victims. Social networks such as Facebook and MySpace are used less frequently, but are often used to target minors specifically.

Traffickers often vary the tactic used depending on the characteristics of the woman or girl being targeted: recruitment may be through grooming, or through false job advertisements, such as false modelling businesses. If coercion is used, trafficking is constituted. Traffickers may pose as a legitimate business in order to lure victims, advertising employment opportunities online. Trafficking rings have even been known to pay Google to boost the prominence of their advertisements (such as 'Somad Enterprises', a supposed advertising agency).

They may target the demographic of victim that they are looking for by specifying the required age and gender of potential workers, or by posing as a modeling agency or massage parlour. Adverts may be unspecific, such as "Hiring bikini model types—instant cash—must be 18". Once victims have been recruited, their services may then be advertised online as well.

. Online Advertisement

Advertisement is essential in traffickers gaining clientele for their victims. Online advertisements have substantially impacted the field of sex

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trafficking and are increasingly common for a number of reasons: Online advertising provides more of a cover from law enforcement than the street; a broader range of potential customers can be advertised to; advertising online connects traffickers with higher-paying clients, who are willing to pay for the anonymity that the internet provides; marketing can hide the nature of the business: children can be marketed as adults and victims of trafficking can be presented as voluntary sex workers. Traffickers also may film their victims' sexual services as a form of advertisement.

. Online Classifieds

Online classified websites allow individuals to post advertisements in the same way as a newspaper classified section, reaching a wide audience. Online classifieds enable traffickers to pimp out their victims with little personal risk, often free of charge and anonymously. Websites such as backpage, and locally-based advertisement websites, are used to advertise commercial sex transactions.

. Websites

Traffickers may use their own websites to advertise their 'employees'. Most pose as legitimate businesses, and may advertise other businesses. Traffickers have been known to automate advertisement posts over as many as 20 search engines, using ad generators and pop-ups to attract clients.

. Social Media and Discussion Boards

Social networking sites may also be used to advertise the sexual services of victims. Traffickers set up an account for a victim, using photographs of them to attract potential customers, reach out to potential clients, chat, and advertise their services and prices (posing as the victim).

Calculating demand for their victims' services

Many sex traffickers move location regularly to avoid detection, especially if the victims are minors. By posting online advertisements for their victims'

services, traffickers can determine the level of demand in a city and choose their next destination accordingly. This can make THB more profitable. By looking at a city's common searches on pornography websites, traffickers are informed which girls might be more profitable and which type of woman/girl to target.

Communications with Victims and Clients

Communication technologies allow traffickers to maintain control over their victims through frequent contact. Such communications, as well as those with clients, can serve as evidence of a crime.

Communication between traffickers

The internet has made it easier for traffickers to trade and exchange girls (in order to keep variety for their client base). Traffickers also share information about the best cities and markets for trafficking, and warn one another about law enforcement activity. They may also inform each other if they notice that a victim seems to be attempting to reach out to law enforcement. Even rival gangs have been found to cooperate with one another to engage in sex trafficking.

Prevention of detection

Although the internet and communication technologies are beneficial to sex traffickers, they also present opportunities for law enforcement to track advertisements and set up stings. Their activity can also provide evidence of illegal activity.

As a result, traffickers attempt to avoid detection. Many will avoid documented communication; use phones only rarely; and preferentially use services which are not recorded or that they believe are more likely to avoid detection. Code words are used in communication wherever possible.

Perpetrators who use phones will usually use prepaid ones. However, some traffickers will use smart phones, which can provide evidence of criminal activity, and information regarding their networks, clients and victims.

Sexual services provided through communication technologies

Some victims may be exploited through dates that take place entirely online, through web cameras and chat lines. However, although such work can be highly profitable, it is not reliable and can also be incredibly lengthy and demanding. As a result, traffickers are unlikely to exploit their victims in such a way unless to supplement offline sexual services.

Use of the internet in labour trafficking

There has been little research into whether the internet is used in labour trafficking. There seems to be little evidence of this occurring, however this may be in part due to the difficulties in determining labour trafficking. Since labour trafficking regularly involves a legitimate contracting agency which then keeps workers in bonded labour, it is very difficult to distinguish which offers will lead to labourers being exploited.

Furthermore, persons trafficked for labour purposes have traditionally been told about the job opportunity through a friend or acquaintance, or a newspaper advert. It could be predicted that as vulnerable individuals increasingly rely on the internet in finding job offers, traffickers will use online technologies.

Furthermore, the traffickers themselves do not need to use communication technology to the same extent as sex traffickers, who need to organise dates with clients. Labour traffickers may use pay-as-you go mobile phones but these are difficult to trace. Unless a recruiter or employer has a history of labour trafficking offenses, labour trafficking would be difficult to spot online.

Although internet and communication technologies provide new channels for traffickers, groomers, and consumers of CSAM and WCST, they also provide new channels for law enforcement to detect perpetrators. Newsletter #6 will focus on how various forms of trafficking and exploitation can be prevented, and will provide insight into how utilising technology can play a part.

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The work of IFS-EMMAUS in preventing child exploitation through communication and information technologies

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the number of Internet users and telecommunication services is steadily increasing; in 2013 there were 518,662 registered Internet subscribers and 2,188,429 internet users. Research has found that 1 in 5 children between the ages of 10 to 17 in BiH have been exposed to inappropriate sexual content through the Internet. This is a matter for concern and indicates that prevention measures are required in order to protect fundamental human rights and child safety.

In order to prevent CSAM and other forms of sexual abuse and exploitation of children through information and communication technologies in BiH, IFS-EMMAUS, in cooperation with the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Department for combating trafficking in human beings, and with the support of Save the Children and OAK Foundation, has implemented numerous significant activities with the aim of preventing the publication of illegal, inappropriate and harmful content, and limiting the risks that children and youths are exposed to.

Such activities include establishment of the web portal www.sigurnodijete.ba, which includes four sub-pages designed in accordance with the necessities of the different target groups, namely, the general public; children below the age of 12; teenagers aged 13 to 18; and parents, regarding child abuse and its prevention. The most important section of this interactive web portal is the SOS line established for the reporting of online child abuse cases. A website, www.e-school.sigurnodijete.ba has also been established, aimed to serve as a platform to connect teachers across the country, for them to exchange of experiences and best practices, in order to protect children and youths. IFS-EMMAUS has also created and broadcasted educational videos for children and the general population of BiH, and produced and distributed information materials regarding prevention of online child abuse;



Learn about online safety and/or report online child abuse at www.sigurnodijete.ba

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In order to raise the awareness of children, parents and teachers about the phenomenon of online child abuse through information and communication technologies, educational workshops were held for all of these target groups in elementary and secondary schools throughout BiH, on the theme of "Surf safely." Workshop participants have been educated about safe use of the Internet and learned about the positive and negative elements they may encounter whilst using them. These workshops are extremely useful for parents and teachers' further work with children. Educational workshops were held in more than 50 schools, and attended by over 1,800 students and parents, as well as over 270 primary and secondary school teachers. The result of these activities was the intensification of education on Internet safety in schools across the country, as well as the portal www.sigurnodijete.ba being set as the "homepage" in the classrooms of most of the schools that were involved in the project.

Establishing the Safer Internet Centre in BiH

As a result of IFS-EMMAUS's selfless dedication and sustained efforts in protecting children against all forms of abuse through internet and communication technologies, and extraordinary cooperation with competent institutions in this area, the Ministry of Security of BiH/ Department for combating trafficking in human beings and agencies for law enforcement in BiH gave recommendations for IFS-EMMAUS to be included in the European Commission's program for safer Internet. Particular progress regarding these activities was reached in April 2012, when the Council of Ministers recommended that IFS-EMMAUS establish the Safer Internet Centre in BiH, in order to further their efforts.

The most significant part of the project was establishing the web portal www.sigumodijete.ba, which has sub-pages for children, teens and parents, where these target groups can find interesting, relevant and age-appropriate content detailing how to keep children safe; how to protect them from exploitation online; safer use of the Internet, cell phones, video games; and methods to prevent their misuse. From December 2011, the web portal has been available in English, increasing accessibility of this information to a wider group of Internet users.

The web portal also includes an SOS line for reporting all forms of child abuse occurring through information and communication technologies. This SOS line was established in 2010, and as of May 2014, IFS - EMMAUS had registered 341 reports; a significant increase in its use. Uncompleted applications, including questions from concerned parents and requests for information, made up 268 of this number. All relevant applications were forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement agencies for further proceedings, and the INHOPE database was updated, with the possibility of sending feedback to person who submitted the referral.

European Schoolnet: eSafety Label

The eSafety Label is a European-wide accreditation and support service for schools. BiH's involvement enables schools in the BiH to access the portal, and its resources regarding internet safety, and network with educators across Europe; serving to make the internet safer for school children in BiH. During the last few months, IFS-EMMAUS has actively worked on updating and translating the eSafety Label web portal, and its infographics, into the Bosnian language. Considering that this contains useful illustrative information and statistics for teachers, promotes positive aspects of the eSafety Label project, and enables schools to join and connect with teachers from other countries, IFS-EMMAUS strives to disseminate the project to all ministries of education, and elementary and secondary schools in BiH. Dissemination activities are planned for the start of the new school year in September 2014; and for this purpose an electronic mailing list of schools in BiH will be used. Furthermore, IFS-EMMAUS is preparing activities with regards to gaining the support of the Ministries of Education for the project. IFS EMMAUS is currently continuing its activities in translating the content of the eSafety Label web portal to Bosnian language.



Safer Internet Day

As well as activities aimed at making the internet a safer and better place for children, IFS-EMMAUS, in cooperation with Insafe, a European network of Awareness Centres and Hotlines for online child abuse, initiated the marking of Safer Internet Day in BiH in 2011.



The SID (Safer Internet Day) Committee of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in 2011 to promote activities protecting children and youth during use of information and communication technologies, celebrated BiH's third Safer Internet Day in February, under the campaign slogan "Surf safely". These activities were part of a joint action implemented all over the Europe and the world to promote safe and responsible use of the Internet and mobile devices to young people, realized in cooperation with the international organization INSAFE- European network of Awareness Centre.

Marking Safer Internet Day is one of a series of activities which member organizations of the SID Committee of BiH implement, both together and individually, in order to introduce children and parents to the risks that the internet brings, and adequate protection. The committee is chaired by the State Coordinator for the fight against trafficking in human beings and illegal migration, and the members are representatives of the Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, IFS-EMMAUS, Save the Children, OneWorldSEE and Microsoft BiH.

Full membership of the INHOPE Association - International Association of Internet Hotlines

As a result of its extensive beneficial work, dedication, and creative and innovative ideas, and its unique activities in CSAM prevention in BiH, IFS-EMMAUS became a member of the INHOPE Association in 2010, and an official member of the INHOPE Steering Committee in April 2013. The Head of Office in Sarajevo was made President of the [INHOPE](http://www.inhope.org) network as a result of her dedication to preventing and fighting this phenomenon, in June 2014.



The INHOPE Association is a world leading organization managing Hotlines for reporting inappropriate content online. Through the unselfish support of employees of IFS-EMMAUS, BiH became the 42nd country to become a member. With access to the worldwide database managed by INHOPE, efficient cooperation and data exchange with other members will contribute to efficient combat against the phenomenon in BiH, region and world.

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International Calendar of Anti-trafficking Events

International Calendar of Anti-trafficking Events						Sep 2014
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	1 <i>Geneva, CH (01.-19.)</i> <i>Committee on the Rights of the Child</i>		2	3	4 <i>Webinar</i> <i>New international standard on the elimination of forced labour: implications for business</i>	5 <i>Colorado, USA</i> <i>2nd Annual Northern CO. Human Trafficking Awareness Seminar</i>
7	8	9	10	11 <i>Colorado, USA</i> <i>DATA Juvenile sex trafficking committee monthly meeting</i>	12 <i>Webinar (01.-12.)</i> <i>Eradicating forced and child labour from the supply chains</i>	13
14	15 <i>Texas, USA</i> <i>Set the Children Free – The Fight Against Sex Trafficking</i>	16	17 <i>Texas, USA</i> <i>The Fight Against Human Trafficking and Poverty in Asia and Africa</i>	18 <i>Cardiff, Wales</i> <i>Anti-trafficking networking event</i> <i>Ohio, USA (18.-19.)</i> <i>2014 Human Trafficking, Prostitution, and Sex Work Conference</i>	19 <i>Birmingham, UK (17.-19.)</i> <i>The Business of Slavery</i> <i>Neum, B&H</i> <i>„Justice for Every Child” – Professional counseling of prosecutors in B&H</i>	20
21 <i>Portland Oregon, USA</i> <i>2014 Walk to End Slavery</i>	22 <i>Boston, USA</i> <i>Preventing the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Girls: A Training</i>	23 <i>Manila, PH (22.-23.)</i> <i>Role and Responsibility of government officials in promoting ethical recruitment practices</i>	24 <i>Brussels, BE (24.-25.)</i> <i>The Civil Society Facility (CSF) Partnership Programs-Closing Conference</i>	25 <i>Webinar</i> <i>Introduction to Child Sex Trafficking for Healthcare Professionals Webinar</i>	26 <i>California, USA</i> <i>Educational Forum on Human Trafficking</i> <i>Porto, PT (26.-28.)</i> <i>Emmaus Europe Regional Council - Training on trafficking of Human Beings and political lobbying</i>	27 <i>London, UK</i> <i>Anti-slavery gala fundraiser</i>
28	29 <i>Paris, France (29.-30.)</i> <i>Roundtable on Responsible Supply Chains in the Textile and Garment Sector</i>	30				

International Calendar of Anti-trafficking Events

International Calendar of Anti-trafficking Events						Oct 2014
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
5	6	7	8	9 <i>Nebraska, USA (09.-11.)</i> <i>Interdisciplinary conference on human trafficking</i>	10 <i>Sarajevo, B&H (09.-10.)</i> <i>Experts meeting</i> <i>„Secondary victimization of victims of trafficking”</i>	11
12	13 <i>UK (13.-18.)</i> <i>Cycle for Freedom</i>	14	15 <i>London, UK</i> <i>Developing the Police Response to Tackling Human Trafficking” Conference</i>	16 <i>London, UK</i> <i>Finance against trafficking</i>	17 <i>Belgrade, RS (17.-18.)</i> <i>Conference „Victims’ rights/compensation for victims”</i>	18 Anti-slavery day
19	20 <i>Bath, UK (20.-21.)</i> <i>Make Bath a Traffic-Free Zone</i>	21 <i>Webinar</i> <i>Introduction to Child Sex Trafficking for Healthcare Professionals</i>	22 <i>Sarajevo, B&H (22.-24.)</i> <i>U.S. Department of Justice-OPDAT seminar “Organized crime - Trafficking in human beings”</i>	23	24	25
26	27 <i>Teslic, B&H (27.-29.)</i> <i>U.S. Department of Justice-OPDAT seminar “Organized crime - Trafficking in human beings”</i>	28 <i>N. Carolina, USA (28.-29.)</i> <i>Human Trafficking Prevention Conference</i>	29 <i>Chicago, USA (29.-30.)</i> <i>2014:Global Sex Trafficking Awareness, Freedom and Empowerment Conference</i>	30	31	

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EUROPEAN RESOURCE CENTER
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Related documents

[Child Pornography: Model Legislation & Global Review](#)

[CoE Convention on cybercrime, 2001](#)

[CoE Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, 2007](#)

[Council framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography](#)

[Draft United Nations Treaty on an International Criminal Court or Tribunal for Cyberspace, 2014](#)

[Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography](#)

[Proposal for a draft United Nations Treaty on combating online child sexual abuse, 2014](#)

[The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990](#)

Useful links:

INHOPE network
www.inhope.org

ECPAT international
www.ecpat.net

eNASCO coalition
www.enacso.eu

IFS-EMMAUS web portal
www.sigurnodijete.ba

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